The Emergence of Male Leadership in Competitive Environments

November 30, 2010

By:Reuben, Ernesto (Columbia University)
Rey-Biel, Pedro (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
Sapienza, Paola (Northwestern University)
Zingales, Luigi (University of Chicago)
URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5300&r=ltv

We present evidence from an experiment in which groups select a leader to compete against the leaders of other groups in a real-effort task that they have all performed in the past. We find that women are selected much less often as leaders than is suggested by their individual past performance. We study three potential explanations for the underrepresentation of women, namely, gender differences in overconfidence concerning past performance, in the willingness to exaggerate past performance to the group, and in the reaction to monetary incentives. We find that men’s overconfidence is the driving force behind the observed prevalence of male representation.

Keywords:discrimination, gender gap, glass ceiling, overconfidence, leadership

JEL:J71

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Trends in Quality-Adjusted Skill Premia in the United States, 1960-2000

November 23, 2010

By: Carneiro, Pedro (University College London)
Lee, Sokbae (Seoul National University)

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5295&r=ltv

This paper presents new evidence that increases in college enrollment lead to a decline in the average quality of college graduates between 1960 and 2000, resulting in a decrease of 6 percentage points in the college premium. We show that although a standard demand and supply framework can qualitatively account for the trend in the college and age premia over this period, substantial quantitative adjustments still need to be made to account for changes in quality.
Keywords: inequality, college premium, composition effects
JEL: J0

 


Inequality at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction

November 21, 2010

By:David Card (UC Berkeley) Alex Mas (Princeton University) Enrico Moretti (UC Berkeley) Emmanuel Saez (UC Berkeley)

URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:indrel:1269&r=ltv

Economists have long speculated that individuals care about both their absolute income and their income relative to others. We use a simple theoretical framework and a randomized manipulation of access to information on peers’ wages to provide new evidence on the effects of relative pay on individual utility. A randomly chosen subset of employees of the University of California was informed about a new website listing the pay of all University employees. All employees were then surveyed about their job satisfaction and job search intentions. Our information treatment doubles the fraction of employees using the website, with the vast majority of new users accessing data on the pay of colleagues in their own department. We find an asymmetric response to the information treatment: workers with salaries below the median for their pay unit and occupation report lower pay and job satisfaction, while those earning above the median report no higher satisfaction. Likewise, below-median earners report a significant increase in the likelihood of looking for a new job, while above-median earners are unaffected. Our findings indicate that utility depends directly on relative pay comparisons, and that this relationship is non-linear. Keywords:income, universities, wage information, job search, pay comparison JEL:J01 By:David Card (UC Berkeley) Alex Mas (Princeton University) Enrico Moretti (UC Berkeley) Emmanuel Saez (UC Berkeley) URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:indrel:1269&r=ltv Economists have long speculated that individuals care about both their absolute income and their income relative to others. We use a simple theoretical framework and a randomized manipulation of access to information on peers’ wages to provide new evidence on the effects of relative pay on individual utility. A randomly chosen subset of employees of the University of California was informed about a new website listing the pay of all University employees. All employees were then surveyed about their job satisfaction and job search intentions. Our information treatment doubles the fraction of employees using the website, with the vast majority of new users accessing data on the pay of colleagues in their own department. We find an asymmetric response to the information treatment: workers with salaries below the median for their pay unit and occupation report lower pay and job satisfaction, while those earning above the median report no higher satisfaction. Likewise, below-median earners report a significant increase in the likelihood of looking for a new job, while above-median earners are unaffected. Our findings indicate that utility depends directly on relative pay comparisons, and that this relationship is non-linear.

Keywords:income, universities, wage information, job search, pay comparison

JEL:J01


Produce or speculate? Asset bubbles, occupational choice and efficiency

November 12, 2010

By: Cahuc, P.
Challe, E.
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfr:banfra:298&r=ltv
We study the macroeconomic effects of rational asset bubbles in an overlapping-generations economy where asset trading requires specialized intermediaries and where agents freely choose between working in the production or in the financial sector. Frictions in the market for deposits create rents in the financial sector that affect workers’ choice of occupation. When rents are large, the private gains associated with trading asset bubbles may lead too many workers to become speculators, thereby causing rational bubbles to lose their efficiency properties. Moreover, if speculation can be carried out by skilled labor only, then asset bubbles displace skilled workers away from the productive sector and raise income and consumption inequalities. Classification-JEL: E22; E44; G21.

 

 

Keywords:

Rational bubbles; occupational choice; dynamic efficiency.

This nep–ltv issue is ©2010 by Maximo Rossi. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, it must include this copyright notice. It may not be sold, or placed in something else for sale.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org/. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at < director @ nep point repec point org >.

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Estimating Marginal Returns to Education

November 5, 2010
  1. By: Pedro Carneiro
    James J. Heckman
    Edward J. Vytlacil
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16474&r=ltv
    This paper estimates the marginal returns to college for individuals induced to enroll in college by different marginal policy changes. The recent instrumental variables literature seeks to estimate this parameter, but in general it does so only under strong assumptions that are tested and found wanting. We show how to utilize economic theory and local instrumental variables estimators to estimate the effect of marginal policy changes. Our empirical analysis shows that returns are higher for individuals with values of unobservables that make them more likely to attend college. We contrast the returns to well-defined marginal policy changes with IV estimates of the return to schooling. Some marginal policy changes inducing students into college produce very low returns.
    JEL: J31

This nep–ltv issue is ©2010 by Maximo Rossi. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, it must include this copyright notice. It may not be sold, or placed in something else for sale.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org/. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at < director @ nep point repec point org >.

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