November 28, 2019
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Murat Iyigun (University of Colorado, Boulder); Jared Rubin (Chapman University); Avner Seror (Aix-Marseille Univ, CNRS, EHESS, Ecole Centrale, AMSE, Marseille, France) |
Abstract: |
Why do some societies fail to adopt more efficient institutions? And why do such failures often coincide with cultural movements that glorify the past? We propose a model highlighting the interplay—or lack thereof—between institutional change and cultural beliefs. The main insight is that institutional change by itself will not lead to a more efficient economy unless culture evolves in tandem. This is because institutional change can be countered by changes in cultural values complementary to a more “traditional” economy. In our model, forward-looking elites, who benefit from a traditional, inefficient economy, may over-provide public goods that are complementary to the production of traditional goods. This encourages individuals to transmit cultural beliefs complementary to the provision of traditional goods. A horse race results between institutions, which evolve towards a more efficient (less traditional) economy, and cultural norms, which are pulled towards “tradition” by the elites. When culture wins the horse race, institutions respond by giving more political power to traditional elites—even if in doing so more efficient institutions are left behind. We call the interaction between these cultural and institutional dynamics a cultural revival. |
Keywords: |
institutions, cultural beliefs, cultural transmission, institutional change |
JEL: |
D02 N40 N70 O33 O38 O43 Z10 |
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URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1931&r=ltv |
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November 28, 2019
By: |
Francine D. Blau; Lawrence M. Kahn; Peter Brummund; Jason Cook; Miriam Larson-Koester |
Abstract: |
In this paper, we use 2008-2013 American Community Survey data to update and further probe evidence on son preference in the United States. In light of the substantial increase in immigration, we examine this question separately for natives and immigrants. Dahl and Moretti (2008) found earlier evidence consistent with son preference in that having a female first child raised fertility and increased the probability that the family was living without a father. We find that for our more recent period, having a female first child still raises the likelihood of living without a father, but is instead associated with lower fertility, particularly for natives. Thus, by the 2008-2013 period, any apparent son preference in fertility decisions appears to have been outweighed by factors such as cost concerns in raising girls or increased female bargaining power. In contrast, some evidence for son preference in fertility persists among immigrants. Immigrant families that have a female first child have significantly higher fertility and are more likely to be living without a father (though not significantly so). Further, gender inequity in source countries is associated with son preference in fertility among immigrants. For both first and second generation immigrants, the impact of a female first-born on fertility is more pronounced for immigrants from source countries with less gender equity. Finally, we find no evidence of sex selection for the general population of natives and immigrants, suggesting that it does not provide an alternative mechanism to account for the disappearance of a positive fertility effect for natives. |
Keywords: |
Gender, son preference, family structure, fertility, sex selection, immigrants |
JEL: |
J11 J12 J13 J15 J16 |
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URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1830&r=ltv |
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November 25, 2019
By: |
Walter Bossert (CIREQ – Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, University of Montreal – University of Montreal); Andrew E. Clark (PSE – Paris School of Economics, PJSE – Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques – UP1 – Université Panthéon-Sorbonne – ENS Paris – École normale supérieure – Paris – INRA – Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique – EHESS – École des hautes études en sciences sociales – ENPC – École des Ponts ParisTech – CNRS – Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Conchita d’Ambrosio (INSIDE – INtegrative research unit on Social and Individual DEvelopment – University of Luxembourg [Luxembourg]); Anthony Lepinteur (INSIDE – INtegrative research unit on Social and Individual DEvelopment – University of Luxembourg [Luxembourg]) |
Abstract: |
Economic insecurity has attracted growing attention in social, academic and policy cir- cles. However, there is no consensus as to its precise de_nition. Intuitively, economic insecurity is multi-faceted, making any comprehensive formal de_nition that subsumes all possible aspects extremely challenging. We propose a simpli_ed approach, and character- ize a class of individual economic-insecurity measures that are based on the time pro_le of economic resources. We then apply our economic-insecurity measure to data on political preferences. In US, UK and German panel data, and conditional on current economic resources, economic insecurity is associated with both greater political participation (sup- port for a party or the intention to vote) and notably more support for parties on the right of the political spectrum. We in particular _nd that economic insecurity predicts greater support for both Donald Trump before the 2016 US Presidential election and the UK leaving the European Union in the 2016 Brexit referendum. |
Keywords: |
Economic index numbers,Insecurity,Political participation,Conservatism,Right-leaning political parties,Trump,Brexit |
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URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-02325984&r=ltv |
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November 25, 2019
By: |
Epper, Thomas; Fehr, Ernst; Fehr-Duda, Helga; Thustrup Kreiner, Claus; Dreyer Lassen, David; Leth-Petersen, Søren; Nytoft Rasmussen, Gregers |
Abstract: |
This paper documents a large association between individuals’ time discounting in incentivized experiments and their positions in the real-life wealth distribution derived from Danish highquality administrative data for a large sample of middle-aged individuals. The association is stable over time, exists through the wealth distribution and remains large after controlling for education, income profile, school grades, initial wealth, parental wealth, credit constraints, demographics, risk preferences and additional behavioral parameters. Our results suggest that savings behavior is a driver of the observed association between patience and wealth inequality as predicted by standard savings theory. |
Keywords: |
Wealth inequality, savings behavior, time discounting, experimental methods, administrative data |
JEL: |
C91 D31 E21 |
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URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:econwp:2019:16&r=ltv |
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