Revisiting Gender Differences in Ultimatum Bargaining: Experimental Evidence from the US and China
Shuwen Li (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University) ; Xiandong Qin (Department of Applied Economics, Shanghai Jiao Tong University) ; Daniel Houser (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University)
We report results from a replication of Solnick (2001), which finds using an ultimatum game that, in relation to males, more is demanded from female proposers and less is offered to female responders. We conduct Solnickâ€™s (2001) game using participants from a large US university and a large Chinese university. We find little evidence of gender differences across proposer and responder decisions in both locations. We do however find that, in comparison to Chinese participants, US proposers are more generous, while US responders are more demanding.
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