Inefficient Short-Time Work

By:	Pierre Cahuc (Département d’économie); Sandra Nevoux (Banque de France)
Abstract:	This paper shows that the reforms which expanded short-time work in France after the great 2008-2009 recession were largely to the benefit of large firms which are recurrent short-time work users. We argue that this expansion of short-time work is an inefficient way to provide insurance to workers, as it entails cross-subsidies which reduce aggregate production. An efficient policy should provide unemployment insurance benefits funded by experience rated employers’ contributions instead of short-time work benefits. We find that short-time work entails significant production losses compared to an unemployment insurance scheme with experience rating.
Keywords:	Short-time work; Unemployment insurance; Experience rating
JEL:	J63 J65
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/68ufmnnh3j9vmblf03huqt18qe&r=ltv